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Reciprocity

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ON RECIPROCITY
Law students Daniel Marquez and Patrick Redmond. under the supervision of University of
New Mexico Law Librarians Barbara Lah and Alexandra Siek, researched the issue of reciprocity and
bar membership. This is a short summary of the memorandum discussing the findings of thnt resenrch.
CoHectiveJy the memos discuss the following issues raised by reciprocity: l) the vnrious forms of
reciprocal licensing schemes: 2) the impact that reciprocal licensing has had on bar membership~ 3) a
comparison of reciprocal licensing to admission pro hac vice; 4) legal issues such as constitutional
concerns raised by the adoption or rejection of reciprocity; and 5) professional issues.
Before delving into these topics and the arguments for and against reciprocity h is important to
become famiJiar with the history of professional regulation, reciprocal licensing, and the development
of restrictions on interstate practice, Until the em of the Great Depression, reciprocal licensing under
admission on motion was the rule rather than the ex.ception. 1 During the latter half of the twentieth
century, however. as improved transportution and communications facilitated multijurlsdictional
practice. some states reacted by repealing their reciproca] admission rules. 2 After a 1998 case stirred
the waters3, the American Bar Association created a Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice, which
resulted in a model rule for admission on motion, designed to ease impediments to attomeys• national
mobility. 4 Some states followed with new rules for reciprocal licensing, admission on motion nnd
admission without examination, 5
Critics of multljurisdktiona1 practice reform remain, however. Some have raised states' rights
and inherent powers concerns. 6 Others have argued that argued that "state licensing assures quality
control among Jawyers and protects clients from incompetent practitioners."7 Still others have cast
multijurisdictional prnctice refomi as part of a trend toward encroachment on the legitimate practice of
law by non-lawyers. Proponents of reform have answered that state Ucen.-;ing and regulation would
continue under the ABA proposal. Further. a larger pool of specialized practitioners would more likely
tmhance than detract frotn the quality of legal services in the .state. 8 Refonn ~ponents have suggested
Uuu opponents' real motive for retaining barriers is economic protectiouism. Even the U,S. Supreme
Court has repeated the comment that many states that have "erected fences against ouN>f-state lawyers
have done so primarily to protect their own lawyers from professional competition.'' 10 Apart f:rom
practical nnd professional issues. state harriers to multijurisdictioual practice would seem to be
disfavored under the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause. the Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges and lmmunities Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause, among other provisions.
To be clear, the basic idea behind reciprocity is that the foreign attorney is granted fu!J
admission and licensure with the forum st.ate bar associarion without having to take that state's bar
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examination. But the requirements for such admission differ from state to state. It is helpful to identify
the different licensing schemes in the following manner.
There are basically three licensing methods in use labeled "general reciprocity," "limited
reciprocity," and "strict reciprocity." 11 "General reciprocity" is the most open and flexible form of
reciprocal licensing. Normally any qualified attorney from any state is ;ranted bar admission in a
•·general reciprocity" jurisdiction. Texas 12 and the District of Columbia 3 employ "general reciprocity:·
"Limited reciprocity" is the intennediate form of reciprocal licensing. Under this system only
attorneys from jurisdictions that would extend a reciprocal license to an attorney from the granting state
may receive reciprocal admission. Colorado 14 and Alaska 15 are "'limited reciprocity'' jurisdictions .
..Strict/Specific reciprocity" is the most restrictive form of reciprocal licensing. A "strict/specific
jurisdiction" will only offer reciprocal licenses to attorneys from specific states. Maine 16 has a
«strict/specific reciprocity" agreement with New Hampshire and Vermont. Depending on the state its
reciprocal licensing scheme may have been in place for decades or perhaps only a few years.
The next issue covers what effect, if any, the existence or adoption of reciprocity in a state had
on bar membership and admission by examination. Extensive research in this area found no oouclusive
or correlative evidence that suggested the adoption of reciprocity attracts inordinate numbers of out-of
state attorneys or appreciably reduces the number of applicants sitting for examination. A blanket
conclusion that the adoption ofreciprocity, especially an expruisive form like "general reciprocity," has
no cffec.t on bar admission numbers, even initially, may not be entirely warranted. The District of
Columbia's adoption of reciprocity produced an initial decline in admissions by examination of almost
60%. 17 In other uniquely attractive states or those bordering states with very large bar memberships
such as Califomia, Florida, New Jersey. Nevada. Arizona and even New hiex:.ico. any hypothesis
remains untested, since they have not }'et adopted reciprocity. It does seem that once reciprocity has
been in place for a number of years bnr admission numbers resist fluctuation and revert back to steady
and predictable figures. This has been the case in the District of Columbia, Indiana. Iowa.
Massachusetts, Michigan, and Minnesota. 18
In developing the classification of reciprocal licensing schemes it was important to note that
admission pro liac vice is not the same as nor 1s it a fonn of reciprocity. The major distinction is that a
reciprocal license grants the licensee full, unencumbered membership into that State bar. Admission
pro hac vice does not grant an attorney a license to practice law in that state. Admission pro hac vice
ortly pennits certain court appearances. usually only applies to litigators, and usually limits the number
of appearances fill attorney will be granted per year. Further pro hac vice rules usually do not provide
the same protections that most reciprocity ntles do such as a minimum number-of-years practicing
11
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requirement or the maintenance of an in-state presence requirement. Finally. because reciprocal
licensees are licensed bar members it is easier to assert disciplinary authority over them than unlicensed
attorneys appearing temporarily under pro hac vice rules
The substantive argwnents for and against reciprocity are separated into two categories-those
based on legal issues and those based on professional issues. The n1ost common professional issues
discussed are economic protectionism, cJient autonomy, attorney competence, protection of local court
systems, and attorney discipline. Although rarely admitted by the opponents of refomi. many
commentators, judges, and lawyers identify economic protectionism as the main reason for the
rejection of reciprocity. 19 In fact those states with the largest legal e<:onomies or their neighbors such
as California, Florida. Nevada, Arizona, New Jersey and New Mexico have refused to adopt
reciprocity.

Another argument made to advance reciprocity is that clients are better suited to choose their
legal representatives and should have the freedom to do so.w This may be true for sophisticated and
experienced legal consumers such as large corporations. The reverse argument is that the entire point
of the licensing process is to test attorney competence, ensure client protection. and preve1lt
professional misconduct. .But no evidence or empirical data could be found to impport the argument
that foreign attorneys engage in professional misconduct more frequently or are less competent to
practice law. 21 Additionally, others argue that foreign attomeys have less of a stake in the community.
There is less of an incentive for the foreign attorney ro obtain justice, offer pro bone services,
participate in local continuing legal education, or pursue legal actions or attempt to establish preccdent
which will benefit the community.22 Others have raised concerns ab<:mt :momey djscipliue. It is not
entirely dear how expansive a bar's jurisdictional authority is. Even if disciplinary jurisdiction ex.ists
the resources to discipline out-of-state attorners may not. This concern has been expressed by both the
smallest and largest legal systems in the U.S. 2 And aside from discipline, questions about the civil and
criminal liability of these attorneys also remain unclear.
As for the legal issues raised by reciprocity under the Constitution's anti~protectionist provisions. a
review of case law and commentary compels a curious conclusion. While courts have noted the
burdens intentionally placed on out-of-state competition, for the most part these butdens do not appear
to be constitucionally vulnerable. TI1e practice of law is a constitutionally protected privUege24 • and a
residency requirement for bar admission violates. Article lV's Privileges and Immunities Cfa:us:e.25 The
Supreme Court has suggested, however, that some ruurowlydtaiiored "indicium of commitment"
iv See, e.g., Andrew M. Perlman, A Bar Againsr Competition: The Unco11.stitr11ionality ofAdmission Rules for 0111-ofstme
Lawyers. 18 Geo. J, LOOAL ETHICS 135, 147-48; Gerald J. Clark. The Two Faces of,\<Julri-Jnrisdict1<mal Pra,·tfce, 29 N.
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requirement may be permissible under the Clause.26 A bar examination requirement serves as such an
"indicium of the nonresident's commitment to the bar and to the State's legal profossion. 'm It i$
questionable, however. whether the "intention to prnedce.. requirements many states impose
demonstrate a compa.11lble "commitment" so much as they resemble invalid residency requirements in
bearing only a supelficial relation to it. Nor do bar examinntion requirements seem likely to run afoul
of Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities. Despite a recent District Court declaration that
"limited" reciprocity violates the •·right to travd/' 28the prevailing view seems to be that requiring out
1
of~state attorneys to pass the bar exam cannot constitute prohibited ..differential treatment." ~ For
purposes of Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, restrictions on out-of-state lawyers at least arguably
affect interstate commercial activities. 30 However. courts are unlike) y to doom a bar examination
requirement as unconstitutionally burdensome or discriminatory, since most in-state attorneys have in
fact fulfilled it. 3 ~ As some commentators might say. states can continue to pursue largely protectionist
policies with apparently fun constitutional sanction.
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